Endogenous Timing of Price Discrimination with Technological Incompatibility

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概要

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• We consider two period models in which two firms supply differentiated services and devices for using such services. The firms can discriminate between their own previous customers and other customers. We consider the standardization problem of the devices and the firms'decisions concerning when to offer discriminatory prices. We derive the following results. Standardization increases the firms'profits and social surplus but decreases the consumer surplus. Both firms offer discriminatory prices after (resp. before) the first-period consumption if their devices are incompatible and the production cost is low (resp. high). Neither of the firms offers discriminatory prices if the devices are compatible.

• 東京大学の論文
• 2004-03-18

著者

• 松島 法明

  信州大学経済学部

関連論文

• 価格の上限規制と企業の生産特化(経済法・経済規制と産業組織)
• Endogenous Timing of Price Discrimination with Technological Incompatibility
• 頒布権と中古ゲームソフト販売問題 (特集 法と経済学)

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