規制改革下の公益企業と競争政策

概要

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This paper deals with the argument that a price-cap regulated firm maximizing profits under the price-cap constraint will set prices that over time approach the Ramsey structure. The particular focus is on whether profit-sharing can be introduced in an investment-neutral manner, and on whether there is scope to choose a profit-sharing system which maximizes the expected customer rebate. My analysis explores the effects of intermediate power incentive regulations such as sliding scale when the regulator is badly informed and the firm's profit have a shadow resource cost. The paper then provides a simple account of theoretical consideration in the matter of setting access charges, and analyzes existing policies in this light. Using a mode of a company choosing optimal capacity in the face of uncertain demand and subject to price-cap regulation, it has been shown that the introduction of profit-sharing creates conflicting effects on the preferred level of investment.
関西学院大学の論文
2004-09-20