TRUTH-TELLING EQUILIBRIA FOR BAYESIAN GAMES ARISING FROM SEQUENCING SITUATIONS

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概要

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• This paper considers one-machine sequencing situations with linear costs in which the urgency of players is private information. To study strategic behavior of players based on neighbor switches we associate with such a situation a Bayesian game where the utility functions are based on gain split rules and study whether the truth-telling strategy profile is an equilibrium of the game. The existence of such truth-telling equilibria turns out to be exceptional.

• 社団法人日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会の論文

著者

• Tijs Stef

  University Of Genoa And Tilburg University

• Branzei Rodica

  'alexandru Ioan Cuza' University

• Veltman Ari

  Tokyo Institute of Technology

関連論文

• TRUTH-TELLING EQUILIBRIA FOR BAYESIAN GAMES ARISING FROM SEQUENCING SITUATIONS

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