Higher Order Diferential Attack of MISTY1 without FL functions

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概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• The encyption algorithm MISTY, proposed by Matsui in 1996, is a "probably secure" one against Linear and Differential cryptanalysis. We analyzed MISTY1 without FL functions by Higher Order Differential Attack. This is a chosen plain text attack which uses the fact that the value of higher order differential of the output does not depend on the keys. The necessaryorder for the attack depends on the chosen plain texts and it affects the number of texts and the computational cost. We found the effective chosen plain text which enables the attack to 5 round MISTY1 without FL functions. The attack is ; (Step-1) Using 7th order differential, to determine 4 sub-keys. (Step-2) By the determined keys and 6th order differential, to determine 8 sub-keys. The most time consuring part is Step-1. We estimated that Step-1 needs 1, 408 chosen plain texts and 2^<17> computational cost. We confirmed them by the computer simulation. It took about 0.5[s] on a WS.

• 社団法人電子情報通信学会の論文
• 1998-12-12

著者

• Kaneko Toshinobu

  Kaneko Laboratory Department Of Electrical Engineering Science University Of Tokyo

• Tanaka Hidema

  Kaneko Laboratory Department Of Electrical Engineering Science University Of Tokyo

• Hisamatsu Kazuyuki

  Kaneko Laboratory Department Of Electrical Engineering Science University Of Tokyo

関連論文

• Higher Order Diferential Attack of MISTY1 without FL functions

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