派閥連合組織, リーダーシップ, 分裂回避の戦術自民党の場合

概要

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In this paper, I discuss the possibility applying the organizational model to analize coalitions within Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The crisis for LDP has been brought about through struggling for LDP presidency among leaders of factions in LDP. They form coalitions among factions to win LDP presidential election. Some of them who losed this race would try to weaken ties of the presidential coalition by appealing to members of this coalition to exit out of it, or to members of the anti-presidential coalition <s> not to participate in the presidential coalition. In doing so, leaders of the losing coalition <s> would promise these members the better rewards than they got in the presidential coalition or in the anti-presidential coalition <s>. On the other hand, LDP president should provide his rivals and member of the losing coaltion <s> with selective incentives which are special rewards only given persons who conribute to the mainenance of his presidency. Leaders of factions must not only maintain the present size of their factions, but get more members by strengthening functions of factions such as gaining portfolio, collecting political funds and influencing policies.
社会・経済システム学会の論文
1986-11-01