対華二十一ヶ条の要求と日英関係 : シンガポール駐屯インド兵の反乱を軸として
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During negotiations over the twenty-one demands in put to China, Britain had more interest in China than America. However, the attitude of Britain's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, towards Japan was very passive and one of extreme caution, since he wanted to avoid any breach with the Japanese. Therefore, he did not give the Chinese any hint of support. However, Grey proposed that Japan should refrain from advancing any demands that could be considered to compromise the integrity or independence of China as it would be hard to "reconcile such demands with the terms of the Alliance" But, Grey's cautious approach was ignored by Foreign Minister Takaaki Kato. Kato's adopted such an aggressive stance despite the opposition of the Genro (the Emperor's supreme adviser), politicians in the Diet, the press, and a combination of militaristic pressure and nationalist opinion. Although Kato needed Britain as an ally during the negotiations with China, Grey's telegram of warning did not put any pressure on him and his attitude did not change. One of the aims of this paper is to add some background to the reason why from a military point of view. Kato continued such a strong and agressive attitude towards Britain. At this time, Britain was in a desperate position given the threat of a German breakthrough on the Western Front, while the Central powers were forcing a Russian retreat in the east. At this crucial stage in the war, the Japanese navy continued to render valuable assistance in the search of German ships, in the protection of trade, in the convoy of troops, and in helping the allies with material assistance in the conduct of the war by supplying arms and ammunition. Under such military circumstances, Japanese assistance was essential to British success, so it was desirable not to antagonize Japan. This paper's second view point concerns the influence of the Japanese Naval assistance in violatating the Indian garrison of Singapore, and Kato's "psychological moment" in convection with this incident. Prior to the twenty-one demands and the violation of the Indian Garrison of Singapore, there was already tremendous friction between Kato and Grey. Kato was annoyed at Grey attempt to place strict limits on Japanese military and naval operations in China and the Pacific. Furthermore, Grey proposed that Japan be controlled by a combined French, Russian and British operation. Kato was able to reject Britain's proposals because of Britain's precarious situation in the war. Britain had to change herself geographically for Japan, because of a desperate situation. Britain had to request the dispatch of a cruiser to North America, another three weeks later for the Indian Ocean, and still another one month later for the Dardanelles. Britain's weak position at the time goes some way towards explaining "the bulldozer tactics" of Kato. During this critical situation, the violation of the Indian Garrison of Singapore occurred and negotiations over the twenty-one demands began. The Navy sent the cruisers Tushima and Otowa to Singapore and rendered "Admirable and effective" assistance. Because of the Japanese assistance of arms and ammunitions, protecting convoys and chasing German merchant cruisers, Grey sent seven telegrams of appreciation for the Japanese assistances. Further, he acknowledged in three telegrams the dispatch of the cruiser Ibuki for convoy escort, three cruisers for the American Squadron chasing the German Far-East Squadron, and for the rescue operation of a merchant ship in the Indian Ocean. Such a continuous stream of telegrams must have provided Kato's "psychological moment" support for his agressive attitude toward Britain. Further, the weakness shown when Britain had to kill 50 Indian soldiers in her own colony gave Kato confidence to maintain his diplomatic independence and to keep his position in the cabinet despite strong opposition from the Genro and the press.
- 財団法人史学会の論文
- 1991-06-20
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