ON THE CORE OF THE NETWORK DESIGN GAME

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概要

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• We consider a cooperative game on a communication network system whose objective is to find a fair allocation of the total cost for constructing the network among customers. Since an NP-hard combinatorial optimization problem must be solved for calculating the exact network design cost, we consider a game in which lower bounds obtained by Lagrangean relaxation are used instead of the exact costs. We derive a fair cost allocation for the game and show that the derived allocation vectors belong to the core.

• 社団法人日本オペレーションズ・リサーチ学会の論文

著者

• Kubo Mikio

  Waseda University

• Kasugai Hiroshi

  Waseda University

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