サンローラン=トルーマン時代の加米首脳会談、一九四八〜一九五二年

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The paper begins with a general overview of Canada-US relations, pointing out how the term "asymmetry" might signify bilateral government-to-government interactions across the 49th Parallel. The "asymmetry" in the power ratio of approximately 1 to 10 between Ottawa and Washington, however, does not necessarily mean the junior partner always loses to the senior partner. This conclusion is drawn from past scholarly evaluations of the dyadic conflicts. Drawing on the major works of Lawrence Martin's The Presidents and the Prime Ministers and Roger Frank Swanson's Canadian-American Summit Diplomacy, and expanding the contents by relying on the recently declassified diplomatic documents such as Documents on Canadian External Relations and Foreign Relations of the United States, and other scholarly studies, the paper has set its objective of describing the major dyadic and multilateral conflicts from 1949 to 1952, and will examine the reasons why Canada and the US top leaders acted in the manner they did. During the first 3 years of his regime, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent officially met President Harry S. Truman only twice, both in Washington. The infrequent meeting of leaders was due to the fact that both leaders delegated the conduct of foreign policy and management of the bilateral relations to their respective cabinet ministers, Lester Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs in Canada, and Dean Acheson, Secretary of State of the United States. Another reason for the infrequent meetings between leaders was that there did not exist issues of such importance that warranted such high-level meetings. In both visits, the item of the prime importance for Canada was the St. Lawrence Seaway project, two-decade-old bilateral project of grand design. Due to the expected power shortage in Ontario, the smooth development of the project was a necessity for the St. Laurent regime while Truman, himself approving of the joint venture, acknowledged the persistent opposition of the US Congress and interest groups in American society. The shelving of the joint project in the US House Public Works Committee in July 1951 necessitated another visit to Washington by the Canadian Prime Minister in September. This time, the agenda was completely devoted to the discussion of the St. Lawrence Seaway joint project, and St. Laurent virtually dominated the meeting. As a result, the joint commnunique was issued, proclaiming the project's "vital importance to the security and the economies of both countries of proceeding as rapidly as possible": it also added the Presidential preference "for joint action on the Seaway and his hope that Congress would soon authorize such action", and his support for "Canadian action as second best if an early commencement on the joint development does not prove possible". Though the project was approved and completed during the Eisenhower era, this clear endorsement from the US Executive Office was a good foundation for the future progress of the plan. St. Laurent, having no antagonism towards the Americans, calmly handled the bilateral issues. A not-so-successful scenario was raised at the outset of the Korean War in June 1950. Although no top-level meeting was held with respect to the conduct of the War, Pearson met his counterpart many times often to "constrain" the belligerent US behaviors. Canadian objectives toward the North Korean invasion of the South Korean territory were to repel the invasion by reinforcing the collective secuity principle of the UN, and to bring peace as soon as possible after the restoration of the South Korean regime's sovereignty to the former territorial area. The US objectives, however, changed from obtaining of peace to military victory, and even political unification of the Korean peninsula and defence of Taiwan. Canada contributed its military forces to the War, but attempted to restrain the excessive US unilateralism, often along with the UK, and also mediated the conflicting interests between India and the US and/or other parties concerned. Canada was engaged in this "middle-power" style diplomacy, but its policy outcome was not as successful as Pearson had hoped. For instance, despite Canadian efforts, the UN forces under General MacArthur's command did pass the 38th Parallel and neared the Chinese border, thus inviting attacks from the Chinese voluntary army. The UN resolution that branded China as an "aggressor" was another irritant that Ottawa wished to avoid, but in vain. Moreover, the US often did neither inform Canada in advance of its would-be moves on the military/political side nor consult Canada closely about the issues of prime importance to Canada in the conduct of war and/or foreign policy regarding the Korean War. Canadian failures in influencing US policies may derive from an absence of Canadian representation in Korea (and shortage of Canadian-made information on the local situation), reluctance to question the decisions of the state that provided 90% of the armed forces, and close ties with the US with a natural proclivity of no forceful protestation. The War ended without a direct and useful armistice intervention from Canada except for a few minor matters. Despite the limitations of playing a prominent role in the direction of the Korean War, the Canada-US interactions during this era were not overly politicized in both countries. And both St. Laurent and Pearson made public speeches in Canada, declaring Canadian autonomy from the US. The overall handlings of the relations with the Southern Neighbor was, with hindsight, smooth and lacked the unnecessary troubles.
関西学院大学の論文

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櫻田大造
関西学院大学法政学会

サンローラン=トルーマン時代の加米首脳会談、一九四八〜一九五二年

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