STRATEGIC ENTRY DETERRENCE THROUGH INFORMATIVE ADVERTISING IN A VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED-PRODUCT MARKET

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概要

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• Ishigaki (2000) has shown that strategic informative advertising by an incumbent to deter entry is impossible in a duopoly game of sequential advertising followed by simultaneous price setting when the products are homogeneous. This note shows that the seemingly perverse result survives even when the products are vertically differentiated.

• 慶應義塾大学の論文

著者

• Ishigaki Hiroaki

  Department Of Management And Economics Aomori Public College

関連論文

• STRATEGIC ENTRY DETERRENCE THROUGH INFORMATIVE ADVERTISING IN A VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED-PRODUCT MARKET

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