PROVIDING PROTECTION TO FOREIGN-OWNED PATENTS: A STRATEGIC DECISION
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概要
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This paper examines the question of whether a non-innovating country will protect foreign-owned patents even when the decision to protect patents does not affect the rate of innovation. We consider a three-country setting, with one innovating north and two imitating southern countries. The non-innovating countries differ in their imitating capabilities and market sizes. We show that the interaction between the imitating countries provides motivation for patent protection. In particular, we find that providing patent protection can be an optimal decision for the more capable imitating country under some conditions.
- 慶應義塾大学の論文
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関連論文
- WILL ALL SOUTHERN COUNTRIES EXTEND PATENT PROTECTION TO NORTHERN INNOVATIONS?
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- PROVIDING PROTECTION TO FOREIGN-OWNED PATENTS: A STRATEGIC DECISION