PRICE AND QUANTITY COMPETITION: DO MIXED OLIGOPOLIES CONSTITUTE AN EQUILIBRIUM?

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概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• This paper explores market interaction by oligopolists who may choose different action spaces. It discusses a question of the possibility of equilibrium in oligopoly where some firms control prices and others quantities. More specifically, we consider a two-stage game in which three firms first decide simultaneously whether they take as a control variable price or quantity, and afterwards compete contingent on the chosen types of control variables. By adopting a numerical approach, we show that such mixed oligopolies may emerge as an equilibrium in the two-stage game, depending on the degree of substitutability and complementarity between goods.

• 慶應義塾大学の論文

著者

• Eguchi Sen

  Niigata Sangyo University

• SAKAI Yasuhiro

  University of Tsukuba

• ISHIGAKI Hiroaki

  University of Tsukuba

• Ishigaki Hiroaki

  University Of Tsukuba : Purdue University

関連論文

• PRICE AND QUANTITY COMPETITION: DO MIXED OLIGOPOLIES CONSTITUTE AN EQUILIBRIUM?
• INFORMATION SHARING IN OLIGOPOLY: OVERVIEW AND EVALUATION PART II. PRIVATE RISKS AND OLIGOPOLY MODELS
• INFORMATION SHARING IN OLIGOPOLY: OVERVIEW AND EVALUATION : PART I. ALTERNATIVE MODELS WITH A COMMON RISK

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