SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR THE NON-OPTIMALITY OF MONOPOLISTIC EQUILIBRIUM IN A PURE EXCHANGE ECONOMY

スポンサーリンク

概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• NoteConsider a two commodity and two agent economy. Agent 1 is a price taker and agent 2 is a price setter. Barring the satisfaction of stringent conditions, it is possible for a monopolistic equilibrium allocation to be Pareto optimal.

• 慶應義塾大学の論文

著者

• Saijo Tatsuyoshi

  University Of Tsukuba

• NDOSI Eliawira

  Augsburg College

関連論文

• SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR THE NON-OPTIMALITY OF MONOPOLISTIC EQUILIBRIUM IN A PURE EXCHANGE ECONOMY

スポンサーリンク