BARGAINING WITH DIFFERENTIAL SKILLS

スポンサーリンク

概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• The Nash solution of two-person bargaining game is based on the axiom that all players have equal bargaining power. In this paper, it is extended to allow for possible differentials in individual bargaining skills. Assuming that the frontier of payoffs between players is convex, the solution is shown to obtain at the point where a Cobb-Douglas function defined over payoff space takes on the highest value along the frontier.

• 慶應義塾大学の論文

著者

• Ohyama Michihiro

  Agricultural Economics The Kieo Economic Society Keio University

関連論文

• BARGAINING WITH DIFFERENTIAL SKILLS
• PREDICTIVE AND IMITATIVE EXPECTATIONS IN MACRO-DYNAMIC THEORIES
• PROTECTION AND FACTOR MOBILITY
• MONEY AS A MEANS OF PAYMENT AND STABILITY IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
• TRADE AND WELFARE IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
• TARIFFS AND THE TRANSFER PROBLEM
• THE CASE FOR CURBING CAPITAL OUTFLOW RE-EXAMINED

スポンサーリンク