A BALANCED OUTCOME FUNCTION YIELDING PARETO OPTIMAL ALLOCATIONS AT NASH EQUILIBRIUM POINTS IN THE PRESENCE OF EXTERNALITIES: A CASE OF LINEAR PRODUCTION FUNCTION
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The purpose of this paper is to construct a balanced outcome function which attains Pareto optimal allocations in such a way that nobody has any incentives to deceive the government even if there are externalities. With this outcome function, we will show (1) there exists a Nash equilibrium, (2) every Nash equilibrium is Pareto optimal, (3) every Pareto optimal allocation can be attained as a Nash equilibrium if the initial endowments are suitably redistributed, and (4) every Nash equilibrium is individually rational.
- 慶應義塾大学の論文
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関連論文
- A BALANCED OUTCOME FUNCTION YIELDING PARETO OPTIMAL ALLOCATIONS AT NASH EQUILIBRIUM POINTS IN THE PRESENCE OF EXTERNALITIES: A CASE OF LINEAR PRODUCTION FUNCTION
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