A MODEL OF THE WAGE BARGAINING: WAGE DETERMINATION UNDER BILATERAL MONOPOLY

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概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• The union and employer negotiate with a wage increase. Their behavior is summarized in the claim and offer functions. A sequence of offers and counter-offers determined by the functions above converges to some fixed values of offer and claim. If the former is equal to the latter, they can settle on a new wage level. Otherwise, the union goes on a strike. After several strikes, they reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. The model also shows that the offers are increasing and the claims decreasing during the bargaining process.

• 慶應義塾大学の論文

著者

• Kawashima Yasuo

  Department Of Anesthesiology Teikyo University School Of Medicine

• Kawashima Yasuo

  Department Of Economics Meiji Gakuin University

関連論文

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• A MODEL OF THE WAGE BARGAINING: WAGE DETERMINATION UNDER BILATERAL MONOPOLY

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