A GAME THEORETICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE STACKELBERG DISEQUILIBRIUM

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概要

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• We regard a leader in the Stackelberg disequilibrium as a duopolist who decides his output level before- his rival's decision and then informs him of it, and regard a follower as one who waits to be informed of it and then decides his output level under the information. We formulate this situation as a game in extensive form and provide the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game to give an interpretation to the Stackelberg disequilibrium. Further we discuss a variation of the game.

• 慶應義塾大学の論文

著者

• Kaneko Mamoru

  University Of Tsukuba

• ITO Yozo

  Senshu University

関連論文

• A GAME THEORETICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE STACKELBERG DISEQUILIBRIUM

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