<Articles>Informative Advertising and Strategic Entry Deterrence : A Cournot Model
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概要
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This article reexamines Schmalensee's [1983] advertising entry-deterrence game in which two firms sequentially advertise before simultaneously choosing a quantity. I first show that the post-advertising Cournot-Nash equilibria can be in mixed strategies. This disproves his claim that all of them are in pure strategies. Then, based on my correct characterization of the post-advertising Cournot-Nash equilibrium, I re-analyze his game. It is found that his conclusion based on his incorrect characterization of the post-advertising equilibrium-the first mover may deter the second mover's entry by advertising less than when there is no entry threat-holds true.
- 青森公立大学の論文
- 1999-09-30