積極的安楽死と消極的安楽死(II) : 「殺すこと」と「死ぬに任せること」

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概要

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• This paper examines three main objections raised against James Rachels' claim that the distinction between killing and letting diehas no moral significance. The first objection, which is based upon a rule-utilitarian position, holds that the current moral rules forbidding active killing have the highest "utility value" in the structure of our present moral code and therefore should not be abandoned.The second objection focuses on the interpretation of the AMA statement which Rachels attacks in his argument, and says that he misunderstands the statement because it does not concern itself with the distinction as he supposes. The third objection, which Philippa Foot makes, appeals to the concept of virtue. Accordingto the objection, the killing / letting-die distinction is morally relevant because an unjustified act of killing is contrary to "justice" whereas an unjustified act of letting die is contrary to "charity".

• 埼玉工業大学の論文
• 1993-00-00

著者

• 久保田 顕二

  小樽商科大学

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• 積極的安楽死と消極的安楽死(II) : 「殺すこと」と「死ぬに任せること」
• 積極的安楽死と消極的安楽死(I) : 「殺すこと」と「死ぬに任せること」
• 自然的徳と人為的徳
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