<International Studies> Distributional Problems, Strategic Delay, and International Cooperation : Managing U.S. -Japan Semiconductor Trade Conflict
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概要
- 論文の詳細を見る
I use a private information bargaining approach to analyze the process and outcome of U.S.-Japan cooperation in semiconductor trade. The approach explains that the main source of the U.S.-Japan trade conflict was derived from the states' divergent distributional expectations about how to cooperate. A major negotiation impasse emerged while each state exploited the advantage of its private information. The process of bargaining occurred as a series of steps to align the states' expectations so as to allow for cooperation. The article discusses the empirical performance of the bargaining approach relative to the rational institutional and the power-oriented approach and provides implications for theories of international cooperation.
- 関西学院大学の論文
- 1996-03-01