国連とWTOの関係に関する一考察
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), established in 1995. The international organization that preceded, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), is now part of the WTO agreement. 1) From on historical view point, after GATT was reformed as a real international organization, it was expected to be a specialized agency of the UN system. 2) In 1995 the WTO did not choose to have the status of a specialized agency within the UN system. There are various links between the Secretariat of the UN and the Secretariat of the WTO, such as exchange of relevant information, reciprocal representation, and participation in the Administrative Committee on Coordination. The UN and the WTO have no formal treaty for relationship ; they merely made exchanged letters on 29 September 1995,defining their areas of cooperation. 3) The Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, Article 3 paragraph 5 prescribes that the WTO shall cooperate, as appropriate, with the International Monetary Fund(IMF) and with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and its affiliated agencies. There are two treaties ; one is the "Agreement between the IMF and the WTO", and another is the "Agreement between the IBRD, the International Development Association and the WTO". There are international legal relationships among them, relating to exchange of relevant information, reciprocal representations, and cooperation on overlapping functions. 4) The non-political character of the IBRD is examined here. The Agreement of the IBRD, article 4 paragraph 10 provides that the IBRD and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member and that they shall not be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations are to be relevant to their decisions. For example, the United Nations' General Assembly called upon the specialized agencies to deny to Portugal and the Republic of South Africa the benefits of membership in their respective organizations in its efforts to penalize those states for their colonial and apartheid policies. But the IBRD has refused to do so because the IBRD as a non-political organization has no authority to impose sanctions upon members for conduct unrelated to its purpose. 5) The non-political character of the WTO is examined here. In the era of GATT, on essentially political matters the contracting parties follow the policy expressed in article 86 of the Havana Charter, namely, to avoid passing judgement in any way on such matters and to follow decisions of the UN on such questions. So that, theoretically, the GATT 1947 should avoid passing judgement on all political matters. And the GATT 1994,Article 21 (c) prescribes that nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of in ternational peace and security. This article could be interpreted to mean that the WTO must obey the decision of the UN. But the WTO does not see it as a duty to obey the recommendation of the UN. If the UN should recommend some action under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, the WTO could make some judgement as to whether it would accept this recommendation or not. 6) Lastly, economic sanctions of the UN and countermeasures of the WTO are compared. The standpoint of the "sanction" is essentially different from the "countermeasures". The "sanction" is found in the legal system of "droit de hierarchie et de subordination", while the "counter measure" is found in the legal system of "droit d' egalite et de coordination" : that is, the former is in the vertical legal system, while the latter is in the horizontal legal system. In some cases, the same single action by one state can be interpreted not only as a sanction but also
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