<ARTICLE>Noisy Signals, Credit Rationing, and Bank Asset Quality : Internal Fragility of Banking Industry

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概要

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• In the presence of asymmetric information, banking industry is internally fragile and can cause hostile environments in the economy without economy-wide adverse shock such as debt deflation. Banks' asset quality can deteriorate even when banks ration funds away from risky borrowers. The situation is very serious when banks are myopic and/or their monitoring technology is in-efficient. The contingent contract based on the borrower's quality choice is no more feasible and banks keep lending based only on the inexpensive information. These results are derived under more realistic assumptions than those in the recent literature. JEL Classification : E44 G14 G21

• 大阪府立大学の論文

著者

• Kuroki Yoshihiro

  College Of Economics Osaka Prefecture University

関連論文

• Noisy Signals, Credit Rationing, and Bank Asset Quality : Internal Fragility of Banking Industry

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