Corruption, Central Bank Independence and Inflation

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概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• The paper investigates relations between political and monetary institutions. It shows how corruption indexes, understood here as indicators of the stringency of the rule of the law, can be related to inflation performance. Two main results indicate behavioral differences between developed and developing countries : (1) More corruption is related to higher inflation, but that relation is much more significant in developed countries ; (2) In developing countries, indexes of real independence and corruption are positively related : the higher the turnover for central bank governors , the less corrupt a country.

• 関西学院大学の論文

著者

• Farvaque Etienne

  Universite Catholique De Lille

関連論文

• Corruption, Central Bank Independence and Inflation

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