A Simple Model of Regulated Firms' Incentives for Quality Supply

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概要

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• This paper examines quality-improving investment decisions of regulated firms and their welfare effects in the presence of unknown taste for quality and limited regulatory commitment. A signaling game model is employed in order to focus on the effects of asymmetric information and limited commitment. The analysis provides an instance of information asymmetry's contribution to regulated firms' quality supply.

• 関西学院大学の論文

著者

• Mizuno Keizo

  School Of Business Administration Kwansei Gakuin University

関連論文

• A Simple Model of Regulated Firms' Incentives for Quality Supply
• Network Investment and Competition with Access-to-Bypass(The 7th Workshop on Stochastic Numerics)

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