Fault Analysis of the NTRUEncrypt Cryptosystem

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概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• In this paper, we present a fault analysis of the original NTRU public key cryptosystem. The fault model in which we analyze the cipher is the one in which the attacker is assumed to be able to fault a small number of coefficients of the polynomial input to (or output from) the second step of the decryption process but cannot control the exact location of injected faults. For this specific original instantiation of the NTRU encryption system with parameters (N,p,q), our attack succeeds with probability ≈ 1 - 1/p and when the number of faulted coefficients is upper bounded by t, it requires O((pN)t) polynomial inversions in Z/pZ[x]/(xN - 1).

• （社）電子情報通信学会の論文
• 2011-04-01

著者

• Youssef Amr

  Concordia Institute For Information Systems Engineering Concordia University

• Kamal Abdel

  Concordia Institute For Information Systems Engineering Concordia University

• KAMAL Abdel

  Concordia Institute for Information Systems Engineering, Concordia University

関連論文

• Cryptanalysis of Hwang-Lo-Hsiao-Chu Authenticated Encryption Schemes
• Cryptanalysis of a Public Key Encryption Scheme Using Ergodic Matrices
• Fault Analysis of the NTRUEncrypt Cryptosystem
• Cryptanalysis of a GL(r,Z_n)-Based Public Key System

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