SINGLE-LEVEL STRATEGIES FOR FULL-INFORMATION BEST-CHOICE PROBLEMS,I
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概要
- 論文の詳細を見る
- 1997-05-01
著者
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Szajowski Krzysztof
Institute of Mathematics, Technical University of Wroclaw
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Sakaguchi Minoru
Research Institute For Information Systems Nagota University Of Commerce And Business Administration
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Sakaguchi Minoru
Research Institute For Information Sytems Nagoya University Of Commerce And Business Administration
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Szajowski Krzysztof
Institute Of Mathematics Technical University Of Wroclaw
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Szajowski Krzysztof
Institute Of Mathematics And Computer Science Wroclaw University Of Technology
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