Japan-U. S. Security Relationship during the Sato Administration: The Reversion of Okinawa and the Issue of Japan's Shared Responsibility in the "Free World":Reexamining Yoshida's Diplomatic Choices
スポンサーリンク
概要
- 論文の詳細を見る
This article reviews the Okinawa reversion negotiations from the standpoint of Japan's "shared responsibility" issue in the context of the Japan-U. S. security relations. It was during the 1960s that the Japanese government began to be aware of Japan's growing international economic role in the Asian Region. The issue of Japan's security role also became salient during the Okinawa reversion negotiations.Prime Minister Sato first raised the Okinawa reversion issue in a meeting with President Johnson in January 1965. However, the Johnson administration was not in favor of tackling the issue at that time. Okinawa was an essential staging area for U. S. forces engaged in the Vietnam War. On 14 November 1967, Johnson requested that Japan be ready to take over the responsibilities for its defense. Furthermore, the U. S. indicated that Japan must permit U. S. military operations in Okinawa which might require nuclear weapons to be placed there as well as U. S. combat operations conducted from there.Japan entered into negotiations with the U. S. in 1969. Sato insisted that Okinawa should be treated the same as the "homeland" when the reversion took place. The U. S. government claimed that Japan had to accept more responsibility for regional security if Okinawa was to be reverted back to full Japanese control and covered by the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty. The U. S. government had already accepted the reversion in NSDM 13 on May 28, and set down the conditions for the reversion: the first was that Japan accept maximally free conventional use of American military bases specifically with respect to Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam, and the second was that Japan approve storage and transit of nuclear weapons in Okinawa by the U. S. during emergencies.The U. S. position was that Japan had to accept the above conditions as part of Japan's new responsibility in the "Free World" after the reversion of Okinawa. The Sato administration accepted these conditions. In the summit meeting held on 19 November 1969, PM Sato and President Nixon reached an agreement on the reversion. They also signed the secret minutes in which Japan accepted the storage and transit of nuclear weapons by the U. S. in Okinawa during emergencies.After the agreement on the reversion, Japan and the U. S. went on to plan for SDF deployment in Okinawa. Through the Okinawa reversion negotiations, Japan and the U. S. reached an understanding about Japan's shared responsibility in the "Free World." Future Japanese actions were to be taken within the ambit of the Japanese Constitution and the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty. This understanding basically was sustained up to the end of the Cold war.
- 一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会の論文
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会 | 論文
- ペルシャ湾保護国とイギリス帝国 : 脱植民地化の再検討
- The Revolutionary Diplomacy in the Era of Chinese Nationalist Revolution:East Asia and Japan during a Period of Transition : Historiclal Study
- The Conditionality in the Development Assistance : A Study on the Operational Activities by IMF, the World Bank, and UNDP:The United Nations in a Changing World
- The Sudeten Problem and World Politics between two World Wars:Studies on Diplomatic History of Contemporary Europe
- Hitlers Leadership in Foreign Policy: Chiefly on the Recent Trend of Study in West Germany:The Eve of the Second World War : International Relations in Summer, 1939