The German-Japanese War in Tsingtao, China: Japan's entry into World War I
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概要
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Japan's entry into World War I is often said to have been at the behest of its ally, Britain. The First World War began on 28 July and Britain entered the war on 4 August. Three days later, Britain requested Japan to remove the German fleet from Tsingtao (Qindao) in China as Britain wanted protection for its merchants ships sailing the coast of China.However, even before that, Japan had already begun to believe that it would become involved in the war after learning on 2 August that Russia, with which Japan had concluded an entente, would be going to war with Germany. The Minister of the Navy had sent an order to the commander of the Second Fleet to prepare for deployment. The "strategic plan" for the removal of the German fleet from Tsingtao was already being hammered out by the next day. The army also had begun preparing its own battle plans. From 4 August, the entire navy had already begun concrete preparations for fighting the Germans in Tsingtao. Preparations for the Second Fleet were completed along with those for the expeditionary force on the tenth day of that month. The request from Britain came when these preparations were already underway. It is, therefore, clear that Japan's entry into the war was not simply a result of the British request.The army, the navy, the bureaucracy of the Foreign Ministry and powerful politicians were all as eager to join the fight with Germany as the Foreign Minister. Leading politicians from the older generation and elderly statesmen (genro) were more cautious, but this proved to be more of an exception. It was the hope of the Foreign Minister and those that agreed with him that by chasing Germany out of China Japan would be able to establish hegemony over the Far East, strengthen its cooperative relationship with China, and furthermore, be able to improve its international standing by maneuvering to be one of the victor naitions after the war. Japan was given a concrete excuse for participating a war in Europe with the appearance of the British request. It is said that the Foreign Minister at that time tried to keep the genro out of the decision process. However, what was more important than anything for him was not the elimination of the genro from this process but to enter the war as quickly as possible.Until now, opposition voiced by part of the navy has been cited as evidence of the entire navy's reluctance to joining the war. However, it is not possible to understand the events after 2 August through that kind of interpretation. Furthermore, since the navy were busying themselves with plans forestablishing a central headquarters, it is difficult to say that Japan's entry in the war was a passive event. Although there was some disagreement among the genro and part of the navy, the Japanese-German war in Tsingtao was a war that was unanimously advocated by the cabinet and that was voluntarily started with the same purposes, ambitions and plans as any other war. The war did not happen because of coincidental request from a foreign government; the Japanese government was able to make use of the British request to further its own aims. Even if the Tsingtao war had not occurred, there can be little doubt that Japan would have taken on Germany at some point given Japan's intentions.
- 一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会の論文
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会 | 論文
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