ASEAN in Japanese Foreign Policy:ASEAN at 30: Between Myth and Reality

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Postwar Japan's role in Southeast Asia has been predicated on two main factors: the orientation of Japanese foreign policy conditioned by a degree of U. S. involvement in Southeast Asia, and Japan's capabilities. By utilizing the two factors, the following four, options of Japan's Southeast Asian policy will be accrued. Concomitantly, the contour of Japanese foreign policy toward the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) can be divided into the four periods which correspond to the above options.The first period is called "the U. S. -first policy" during the 1950s and 1960s where Japan's Southeast Asian policies were induced largely by American cold war policy and Japan's limited capabilities. During this period, intertwined with the American cold war strategy, Japanese policy toward the region began to foster a triangular relationship, linking U. S. capital, Japanese technical know-how and Southeast Asian raw materials. Accordingly, the reparations settlement became an integral part of this diplomacy and soon served as the catalyst for Japan's economic intrusion into the region. Through the reparations negotiations, thus, Japan's first coherent policy toward Southeast Asia emerged, and it continued after the establishment of ASEAN in 1967.The second period is called "the bridge-building policy" of the 1970s reflecting Japan's Asian orientation and limited capabilities. This period evolved around the so-called Fukuda Doctrine which has the following characteristics. First, the Doctrine established a systematic framework for Japan's political conduct in the region, as exemplified by the bridge-building approach to ASEAN and Indochina until 1980. Secondly, Japanese contacts with ASEAN as a viable regional organization have been developed. Thirdly, Japan's policy toward the North-South problems has become more constructive. As a result, the second period rendered two features: (1) Japanese foreign policy was changed from passive to active involvement in the region with increasingly political intentions, and (2) Southeast Asian demands and interests played an increasing role in Japanese decisionmaking, with the apparent exception of trade issues.The third period is called "the active policy" of the 1980s where Japan with increased capabilities was willing to get involved in Southeast Asian political affairs including the Cambodian conflict. Japan, in particular, intended to coordinate its policy with ASEAN to bring about tangible effects on regional affairs. It should be noted that through joint efforts to resolve the Cambodian conflict, Japan came up with several unique policies, such as financial support for PKO, human contributions to the political settlement as well as the comprehensive development of the Indochinese countries. All of these positive policies were finally culminated in the Tokyo conference on Cambodia in June 1990, which paved the way for its final resolution.The fourth period is called "the Asia-first policy" of 1990s where Japan is expected to play a larger role in the region due to the two reasons. First, the major reduction of American presence in the region has compelled Japan to do something politically, and second, the expectation of ASEAN on Japan's greater role has risen. The East Asian Economic Caucasus (EAEC) is a case in point here. Japan's ASEAN-first policy, however, has encountered a vehement objection from the United States, thereby dragging Tokyo into a policy dilemma. Whether or not Japan can really pursue its ASEAN-first policy remains to be seen.
一般財団法人日本国際政治学会の論文

ASEAN in Japanese Foreign Policy:ASEAN at 30: Between Myth and Reality

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概要

一般財団法人日本国際政治学会 | 論文

スポンサーリンク

ASEAN in Japanese Foreign Policy:ASEAN at 30: Between Myth and Reality

スポンサーリンク

概要

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会 | 論文

スポンサーリンク

一般財団法人日本国際政治学会 | 論文