Analytical Framework of Intellectual Property Right Issues: Political Economic Structure of International Legal Disputes and Conflicts:The Turn of International Relations Study in the Advent of Multimedia Age
スポンサーリンク
概要
- 論文の詳細を見る
The purpose of this paper is to develop the basic framework for analyzing international conflicts on intellectual property rights (IPRs). The framework presented here does not shed light on the legal aspects of the issue, as have been conventionally studied, but on the "economic" motivation and the "political" process of States and Firms. Transnational discord and cooperation between States and Firms caused by those motivations and processes are examined as the primal factor of conflicts.Section I clarifies the distinctive interests and roles of States and Firms in the protection of IPRs. Firms seek to gain economic profits through their global business networks and international enforcement of IPRs, while States stick to maximizing national welfare by optimizing the cost-benefit balance of domestic IPRs protection. The former often jeopardizes national IPRs systems established by the latter. States attempt to regain welfare but they cannot realize it without Firms' cooperation.Section II develops the economic-motivation models of three different international conflicts: North-North, South-North, and Multi-lateral. These models are based on economic theories of invention, industrial organization, and strategic trade policy. States promote international transfer of income by utilizing IPRs system as trade policy instruments that help domestic Firms to gain excess profits from foreign markets. Similar efforts of States, however, contradict each other. North-North conflicts center upon domestic procedures of strong IPRs systems. South-North conflicts are the straight choice between strong IPRs systems and weak ones. When conflicts become Multi-lateral, the leaders of Northern nations have to make concessions to other Northern nations so as to press the South.Section III explains the national and transnational political processes between States and Firms, which spur on or discourage States to conflict. Theories of Triangular Diplomacy and Two-Level Games are relevant to the understanding of the logic of complex processes. "Domestic" Firms may benefit "foreign" States while "foreign" Firms may contribute to "domestic" interests of States, if Firms find it profitable to license their IPRs transnationally or produce goods embodying IPRs overseas rather than export goods. In addition, national IPRs policies cannot help changing income distribution among domestic Firms, which sometimes results in transnational alliances between damaged Firms and foreign States opposed to those policies. Therefore, States are forced to negotiate with Firms, whether domestic or foreign, to realize the international income transfer that was described in the previous section. The more transnational cooperation between States and Firms, the less conflicts between States, and vice versa. Dispute between the U. S. and EC on Section 337 of the U. S. Tariff Act is briefly analyzed to support this hypothesis.
- 一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会の論文
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会 | 論文
- ペルシャ湾保護国とイギリス帝国 : 脱植民地化の再検討
- The Revolutionary Diplomacy in the Era of Chinese Nationalist Revolution:East Asia and Japan during a Period of Transition : Historiclal Study
- The Conditionality in the Development Assistance : A Study on the Operational Activities by IMF, the World Bank, and UNDP:The United Nations in a Changing World
- The Sudeten Problem and World Politics between two World Wars:Studies on Diplomatic History of Contemporary Europe
- Hitlers Leadership in Foreign Policy: Chiefly on the Recent Trend of Study in West Germany:The Eve of the Second World War : International Relations in Summer, 1939