The Politics of Response:The Canadian and Japanese Foreign Economic Policies toward the "Nixon Shocks" of August, 1971

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No unilateral US policy has caused as fundamental a shift in the international political economy as the so-called "Nixon Shocks" of August 15, 1971. By forcibly suspending the US dollar's convertibility to gold and imposing a 10% import surtax on all dutiable goods, the Nixon regime destroyed the Bretton Woods international monetary system, and precipitated strain with its allies. Washington's largest and second largest trading partners were especially damaged, and took steps to counteract the Shocks. The outcomes of Ottawa's and Tokyo's policies, however, were divergent: in the end, Canada achieved diplomatically more than Japan without making any apparent concessions. Specifically, the Japanese acquiesced in its "textile wrangle" with the US, and unwillingly accepted a larger-than-expected up-valuation of the yen against the dollar. The Canadians, on the other hand, succeeded in lifting the surtax with the lucrative Canada-US Autopact intact.This paper concentrates on theoretically answering an important question of "why did Canada and Japan receive diverse bargaining outcomes?" For that purpose, the paper identifies the bureaucratic politics model, intervulnerability model, and complex interdependence model to examine its explanatory power for this ease.The bureaucratic politics model created by G. Allison and M. Halperin, and refined by J. Rosati is a conceptual framework integrating Allison's 2nd and 3rd models. According to this model, the policy outcome of each actor in its response to Nixon's enforcement of his measures derives from the decision-making process reflecting (often irrational) "pulling and hauling" of major players or semi-automatic process based on existing Standard Operating Procedures. Invariably, the outcome is neatly explained if Japan produced the unfavorable decision-making process similar to the bureaucratic politics model whereas Canada did not.The intervulnerability model was suggested by C. Doran. Going beyond the metaphor of "interdependenced", he proposed that the Canada-US dyadic relations should be characterized by "intervulnerable" nature. Accordingly, what the US unilaterally did like the 1963 imposition of Interest Equalization Tax would be self-defeating because the interlocking nature of both economies would damage the US economy as well as the Canadian one. If this logic prevails, the surcharge and other unilateral economic measures to Canada can be lifted while Japan still suffers from them because of Japan's absence of intervulnerability with the US.This paper denies the above two explanations of the divergent outcomes of two dyads, and revives the complex interdependence model envisaged by R. Keohane and J. Nye as a proper explanatory tool. The absence of hierarchy among issues is an important element in explaining the different results of negotiations. Within the Nixon cabinet, high politics of H. Kissinger, prevailed over low politics of economic diplomacy by J. Connally, thereby creating the room for maneuver for Canada. Why was this room for maneuver not utilized by Japan? Enter another condition of this model, multiple channels of contact. The emergence of de facto transgovernmental allies of Kissinger and A. Burns, played a decisive role in defending Canada's national interest. As a result, Canad-US multiple channels of contact fragmented the US decision-making process, while fewer channels between the allies across the Pacific did not do so. The result was the US acted as if it were a fragmented actor to Canada, but it was more unitary toward Japan. The paper concludes this is why the American preponderance of power vis-a-vis Japan resulted in better bargaining outcomes for the lamer power than in the case of the Canada-US dyad.
一般財団法人日本国際政治学会の論文

The Politics of Response:The Canadian and Japanese Foreign Economic Policies toward the "Nixon Shocks" of August, 1971

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概要

一般財団法人日本国際政治学会 | 論文

スポンサーリンク

The Politics of Response:The Canadian and Japanese Foreign Economic Policies toward the "Nixon Shocks" of August, 1971

スポンサーリンク

概要

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会 | 論文

スポンサーリンク

一般財団法人日本国際政治学会 | 論文