Relative Gains, Uncertainty, and Cooperation under Anarchy: Beyond Neorealism and Neoliberal Institutionalism:International Cooperation during Systemic Transformations
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In recent years there has been a vigorous debate about the problem of conflict and cooperation under international anarchy. This debate has involved two of the most influential approaches to international relations theory, i. e., neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. The problem of absolute and relative gains divides these two approaches. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it summarizes the debate and argues that both of the two approaches are incomplete as a theory of conflict and cooperation under anarchy. Second, it attempts to outline a new approach to the problem of interstate cooperation that overcomes the shortcomings of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism.Scholars in the realist tradition have long argued that anarchy inhibits cooperation among states. Since the beginning of the last decade, neoliberal institutionalists have challenged this realist assessment of the possibilities for international cooperation. Assuming that states are "rational egoists" who seek to maximize their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains of others, neoliberals claim to accept the realist view that anarchy makes cooperation among states difficult. According to their view, states under anarchy find it hard to work together because agreements cannot be centrally enforced (compliance problem or cheating problem). They argue, however, that international institutions can reduce the attractiveness of cheating and thus are able to promote cooperation.Recently, neorealists have replied that there is a fundamental flaw with this neoliberal challenge to realism. Their argument goes as follows: Neoliberal institutionalists can see only one of the two major difficulties associated with cooperation among states, because they misinterpret core elements of realist theory and assume that states are rational egoists. For realists, anarchy means that states fear not just being cheated but also being dominated or even destroyed by others. As a result, realists do not believe that anarchy causes states to be rational egoists, but instead to be "defensive positionalists" whose fundamental goal is to achieve and maintain relative capabilities sufficient to remain secure in the self-help context of international anarchy. In turn, realists argue that a state will decline to join a cooperative arrangement if it believes that gaps in gains will substantially favor partners (relative gains problem). Realists therefore maintain that states must solve both the compliance and relative gains problems to achieve cooperation. Neoliberals, however, cannot take the relative gains problem into consideration, because they assume that states do not care about relative gains. Thus, neorealists conclude that neoliberal institutionalism cannot be applied to international politics where states seek relative gains rather than absolute gains.This paper argues that both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are incomplete as a theory of conflict and cooperation under anarchy. Although neorealism correctly points out both of the two inhibitory effects of anarchy on the willingness of states to work together, it can say little, if any, to the question of how these problems can be solved in order to achieve cooperation. In the neorealist world, it seems that systemic constraints are so overwhelming that human creativity is totally incompetent against it. Here lies the merit of neoliberal institutionalism. It tries to show how human creativity can alleviate systemic constraints. However, as was mentioned above, its assumption about state preferences is seriously inappropriate.Thus, this paper argues that a new approach to the problem of cooperation under anarchy must be devised. The new approach has to meet the following two requirements. First, it must be able to take both the compliance and relative gains problems into consideration. Second, it must be able to show how these problems can be solved.
- 一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会の論文
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会 | 論文
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