Reconsideration of Hume's theory of justice-Why can we understand the problem of the sensible knave?
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Within Hume's moral theory, justice is held to be derived by convention, and this is often supposed to involve a kind of utilitarianism. But I doubt the validity of this interpretation since it overlooks the role of individual interest. On the other hand, there is a contractarian interpretation of Hume's theory, emphasizing 'rationality', which makes a compatibility between justice and self-interest possible. According to this view, the sense of duty is 'feigned' by all subjective minds which wish to secure a predictable 'rule of law' for the sake of their own interest. This position may be called 'subjectivistic Humeanism'. Regarding Hume's theory as an 'error theory', it holds that 'promising' is an instrument to maintain a stable society for the sake of each member's interest.In this paper, I argue that this subjectivistic interpretation is invalid and mistaken, because it misrepresents the background of Hume's theory of justice, seeing the general background of Hume's philosophy as a kind of anti-realism. I present substantial textual evidence to show that Hume does not endorse any general 'subjectivism' or 'projectivism', and I place special emphasis on the point that Hume recommended proper recognition of values by our moral sense, setting aside 'superstition' and 'enthusiasm'. The aim of this article is to bring out the realistic worldview underlying his thinking and its moderation, and to demonstrate that it can accord with a liberal theory of justice.
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