応用科学哲学の問題としてのリスク
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概要
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The practice of risk analysis and its validity have invited heated controversies for many years. In this paper, I approach this issue from the point of view of "an applied philosophy of science". Two common models of risk analysis, i.e. the positivist and the social constructivist models, seem untenable because they reflect positions already refuted in the philosophy of science. Kristine Shrader-Frechette and Deborah Mayo offer alternative post-positivistic models of the risk analysis (scientific proceduralism and a metascientific analysis, respectively). Although I agree with them in many respects, their images of uncertainty in the risk analysis seem to be somewhat coarse-grained. I introduce a Bayesian point of view as a refinement in the post-positivistic model.
- 日本科学哲学会の論文
日本科学哲学会 | 論文
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