Moral Realism and Rule-Following Considerations

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In this paper I defend moral realism by considering Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following in his Philosophical Investigations. Due to the lack of any positive theory in Wittgenstein's text, this argument is supplemented by my reconstruction of Wittgenstein's theory of aspect in Part II of Investigations. In trying to answer the "paradox" of rule-following made famous by Kripke, I will show that, in the spirit of direct realism, an aspect of normativity, if it the has proper surroundings (Umgebung), is a fact of normativity, which rules that the subject ought to do such and such. This basic thesis is coupled with the (Sellars-McDowell's) idea of the space of reasons, which is also joined with the idea of fact causation. As a result, we can think that moral facts or facts of normativity do have causal efficacy, as long as they are reasons for action. This theory is, therefore, naturalistic as well as rationalistic, although this "naturalism" is in the sense of second nature a la McDowell. The notion of aspect itself will also be given a naturalistic interpretation analogous to the Gibsonian conception of information. The paper will proceed more like drawing a (better, alternative) picture, than giving a set of arguments, because of the nature of the topic.
日本哲学会の論文