ロシアの安全保障分野における対中関係:―リスク回避と実益の追求―
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概要
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The aim of this article is to provide an analysis of the nature of Russia's security issues with China by focusing on two areas. Firstly, the study will see examples from Russia's bilateral security relationship with China. Secondly, the analysis will subsequently provide an overview of the countries' wider global interests. Resultantly, the article hopes to show that there exists no governing principle per se in Moscow's relationship with Beijing but rather a cautious case-by-case approach. Reconciliation over border demarcation, an issue that spilled over into the actual conflict in 1969, has been critical in assuaging security relations between Moscow and Beijing. In their settlements of 1997 and 2004, both China and Russia made significant concessions on this issue despite fierce opposition within each country. This negotiation process was combined with the development of their relationship from reconciliation towards "strategic partnership." However, Moscow's efforts were driven by a longstanding desire to remove unstable elements on the border rather than an actual aspiration for greater security cooperation. Furthermore, Russian arms sales to China were a significant factor in their relationship and did reinforce China's modern military capabilities especially towards the sea. However, arms trade has declined since 2007, largely due to the changing interests of Russian manufacturers and the Chinese equipment program. An export of RD-93 engines to China was suspended following the claim from a military industry executive that such components would be used in the construction of FC-1 fighters, a major export competitor to Russia's own MiG-29. A dichotomy therefore exists in Russia between those seeking export income and those who wish to keep Chinese military capability below their own. Interestingly, Russian exports to India, a potential rival to China, are not so constrained. The first joint military exercise between China and Russia called "Peace Mission 2005" involved thousands of troops and was partly driven by a desire to show power and solidarity. Yet recent military exercises correspond to each country's practical needs. In the "Peace Mission 2010" joint exercise, China for example focused on long-range flight capabilities. Russia meanwhile devotes more time and resources to joint exercises with former Soviet partners within the Collective Security Treaty Organization than it does with China. Finally, China and Russia share resistance to Western humanitarian intervention and pressure for democracy yet both countries found it hard to coordinate their opposition efforts in the 1990s due to varying interests. In the late 2000s each of Russia and China increasingly conducted independent foreign policies, confident in their increased international influence. But whilst common interests make both countries take similar approaches, coordination between them remains scant. In conclusion, the progress of each security issue depends on practical situations related to it rather than an overarching concept between Beijing and Moscow, such as that which used to determine relations during the Cold War. Whilst both share common non-interventionist policies, these are more often sought independently rather than cooperatively. In essence, a deeply embedded fear of China makes Russian bilateral policy cautious, eager not to turn China into a security concern.
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