Message and Key Substitution Attacks on Verifiably Encrypted Signature Schemes
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概要
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In 2004, Menezes and Smart left an open problem that is whether there exists a realistic scenario where message and key substitution (MKS) attacks can have damaging consequences. In this letter, we show that MKS attacks can have damaging consequences in practice, by pointing out that a verifiably encrypted signature (VES) scheme is not opaque if MKS attacks are possible.
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関連論文
- Key Substitution Attacks on the CFS Signature
- On the Security of the Verifiably Encrypted Signature Scheme of Boneh, Gentry, Lynn and Shacham Revisited
- Message and Key Substitution Attacks on Verifiably Encrypted Signature Schemes
- Key Substitution Attacks on Multisignature Schemes
- Rogue Key Attacks on Lu et al.'s Verifiably Encrypted Signature Scheme