On the Security of the Verifiably Encrypted Signature Scheme of Boneh, Gentry, Lynn and Shacham Revisited
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At Eurocrypt'03, Boneh, Gentry, Lynn and Shacham proposed a pairing based verifiably encrypted signature scheme (the BGLS-VES scheme). In 2004, Hess mounted an efficient rogue-key attack on the BGLS-VES scheme in the plain public-key model. In this letter, we show that the BGLS-VES scheme is not secure in the proof of possession (POP) model.
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関連論文
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