Assessment of the United States Intelligence Community Reform: Effects of the Creation of Director of National Intelligence System
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In December 2004, the United States Congress passed “the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004,” which created the Director of National Intelligence (hereafter DNI). This was the most significant overhaul of the basic framework of the U.S. Intelligence Community since it was established in 1947. The basic idea of this reorganization mainly came from so-called “the 9/11 Commission Report” published in July 2004. The report criticized the weak management of the intelligence community headed by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) who was also the head of the CIA, then recommended that the DCI should be replaced by a newly created National Intelligence Director to bring more integration and cooperation to the intelligence community. The object of this paper is to try to examine the following question; “Is the DNI functioning as was expected or not? In other words, is the DNI actually overseeing the Intelligence Community as a real head or not?”Evaluation of Major Factors(1) Status: The DNI, to some extent, has successfully demonstrated his leadership status over the intelligence community. However, some members of the community such as the Department of Defense seem to be still reluctant to recognize DNI's leadership status.(2) Man Power: The DNI has already established his own large institutional manpower base to support him, although it has only analytical function and does not have operational function.(3) Support from the President: The DNI also seems to enjoy strong support from the President to secure his leadership.(4) Budgetary and Personnel Power: The budgetary and personnel power of the DNI endorsed by the legislation is vague and not so strong, more or less similar to the power given to the DCI. The DNI seems to have established actual influence, to some extent, over personnel matters of civilian intelligence institutions such as CIA. However, DNI's actual influence on budgetary and personnel matters of military intelligence institutions affiliated to the Department of Defense seems very limited.(5) Quality of Intelligence Product: There has been some improvement for information sharing in the community after the reform. However, still it is too early to say that the new system has achieved significant improvement in the quality of the analytical products of the community.ConclusionTo some extent, the DNI seems to be successfully overseeing the intelligence community as new head of the community, especially over the civilian intelligence institutions such as CIA. However, DNI's oversight has not been perfect yet, rather partial. Especially DNI's budgetary and personnel power over the military intelligence institutions seems very limited. In other words, as a reality, the intelligence community may be divided into two parts; the civilian part overseen by the DNI and military part overseen by the Secretary of Defense.Given the above-mentioned limitations, it is unlikely that the DNI's oversight on military intelligence institutions would be improved significantly unless the current legislation is amended. The future success or failure of the DNI system also would depend on personality of those who will be actually appointed as the DNI as well as their personal relations with the president and other senior leaders.
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