Electoral Cooperation, Strategic Voting, and Political Spending in the 2000 General Election
スポンサーリンク
概要
- 論文の詳細を見る
This paper analyzes how political actors interacted with the electoral system and political fund regulation system in the 2000 general election. Facilitated by the single-member district portion of the electoral system, the ruling LDP and the Komei Party coordinated their candidacy. Voters were expected to use their ballot to influence the outcome of the election by strategically voting for one of the two top finishers. Candidates spent money to boost their electoral performance. Primary findings in this paper are: Electoral cooperation of the LDP and the Komei Party was successful in keeping the government in power; there was evidence of strategic voting as well as splitticket voting; and the effects of the LDP candidate's political spending on his vote were not significant, while those of other candidates's spending to decrease the LDP candidate's vote were. Thus electoral cooperation gave the LDP candidates unearned extra votes.
- 日本選挙学会の論文