イギリス・キャラハン労働党政権と欧州通貨統合 : IMF危機から欧州通貨制度の設立まで 一九七六–七九年
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The article is set to explain why Britain opted out of the ERM (Exchange Rate Mechanism), the central institution of the EMS (European Monetary System), when the EMS was established in Mach 1979. Possible explanations of Britains policy towards European monetary cooperation are examined under the heading of international strategy, economic considerations and domestic party politics.Callaghans high regard for the relationship with the United States was noticeable in his initial reaction to the EMS. He preferred a global settlement on currency instability involving the United States, and was concerned with the possible impact of the new EMS on the dollar and on US commitment to the security of Western Europe. However, once the Carter administration refused Callaghans proposal and gave its blessing to the EMS, Callaghan was converted to the European scheme because of his commitment to the Atlantic alliance. He feared that, outside of the EMS, Britain might be excluded from the circle of consultation between the United States and Europe on reform of the international monetary system and the future of the Atlantic relationship.At the same time, the general thrust of the governments economic policy was compatible with EMS membership, and could be reinforced by it. After the IMF crisis, Callaghan attempted to contain inflation by negotiating a moderate pay rise with the TUC and to achieve export-oriented growth. In other words, he rejected the option of tolerating higher inflation for the sake of faster economic growth and maintaining international competitiveness with periodic currency depreciation. International monetary stability would buttress this new economic strategy.The lack of domestic support, however, hampered the governments efforts to play its full part in negotiations on the EMS, and eventually led to Britains opting out of the ERM. The governments hands were severely tied for internal party reasons; the Labour Partys leftwing, who regarded the EC as the Capitalist Club, was hostile to any proposal which seemed to threaten Britains national sovereignty and the future of socialist programmes. As long as Callaghans problem derived from the lack of support for the EMS within the Labour Party, it could be mitigated if the Conservatives backed him on the issue. Inside the Conservative opposition, there were actually numerous voices advocating a bipartisan approach to the EMS, including Geoffrey Howe and Nigel Lawson. In the end, the Conservative Party expressed a modest welcome for the EMS. But it was accompanied by a scathing attack on the governments policy, which put an end to any prospect that Britain might be able to enter the EMS on a bipartisan basis.
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