Two-country Negotiation Game by Players Presuming the Opponent's Payoff Structure

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概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• This paper addresses the two-person game with the cognitive frameworks and expresses the process of diplomatic negotiation. The feature of the game in this paper is that players presume their partner's payoff matrix according to information received from the latter and the result of previous games. Each player has a simple cognitive framework (filter) and interprets received information. In this paper, we consider the process of diplomatic negotiation which does not have enough information about the partner and analysis the nature of agreements. The result of simulation shows that even if information is imperfect, there is a possibility of establishing agreements and those agreements include a kind of special agreement, 'mutual misunderstanding.'

• 進化経済学会の論文

著者

• EGASHIRA Susumu

  Otaru University of Commerce

関連論文

• Two-country Negotiation Game by Players Presuming the Opponent's Payoff Structure

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