An Evolutionary Route to the Formation of Coordination in the Iterated Leader's Game with Errors

スポンサーリンク

概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• We studied the evolution of strategies in the Iterated Leader's Game (ILG) where individuals sometimes make mistakes. The results of computer simulations show that the evolutionary path of strategies heads to efficient and robust coordination based on a fixed role differentiation between players. The evolution of strategies sometimes expands their memory capacity and improves on the drawbacks of the strategies of former generations. The results also show that the possibility of errors in the ILG can facilitate the evolution of the coordination where the roles of the individuals, the leader or the follower, are fixed. We also present three important policies that the survived strategies commonly share, which enable efficient coordination among individuals.

• 進化経済学会の論文

著者

• AKIYAMA Eizo

  Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering, University of Tsukuba

関連論文

• An Evolutionary Route to the Formation of Coordination in the Iterated Leader's Game with Errors

スポンサーリンク