An Evaluation of Temporal Credit-Saving Policies II -Promise to Subsidize Leverage Contracts-

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概要

• 論文の詳細を見る

• I show that a temporal credit-saving policy that promises to subsidize the payment of the leverage contract by a prespecified amount if the economy turns out to be bad do not improve the welfare of financial traders. The analysis is based on a 3-period general equilibrium model in which a bond and an equity are traded by risk-neutral traders with different beliefs, and leverage opportunuities are available. Itis assumed that, after the policy is implemented, the previous leveragecontract is adjusted according to its content. Under a condition on the variation of optimism among traders, the policy improves illusionary the welfare of traders since the tax to finance them cannot be foreseen. However, after the tax is levied in the final period, a group of bond holders is worse off. The resulting allocation is Pareto suboptimal.欧文抄録: p.121

• 2013-06-26

著者

• 金子 文洋

  千葉大学

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