Another sense of the ontological innocence of mereology : from a neo-Aristotelian point of view

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投稿論文The problem of the ontological commitment of mereology has provoked a great deal of controversy. One aspect of the problem emerges as the conflict between mereology and familiar ways of counting. In recent years, a novel proposal labeled the Minimalist View has been advanced to solve the conflict. It separates quantifying and counting on the basis of a double notion of existence. The proposal, however, involves a crucial ambiguity concerning the notion of existence, and has been criticized for that fault. In this paper, we first point out that an existing objection to the Minimalist View is not to the point and does not work well. Then, it is argued that the Minimalist View can be recast to be a more plausible and attractive thesis from a neo-Aristotelian point of view, which rests on the concept of grounding. The discussion reveals a neo-Aristotelian conception of the ontological innocence of mereology.