Finitely Repeated Games with Monitoring Options
スポンサーリンク
概要
- 論文の詳細を見る
We study finitely repeated games where players can decide whether to monitor the other players' actions or not every period. Monitoring is assumed to be costless and private. We compare our model with the standard one where the players automatically monitor each other. Since monitoring other players never hurts, any equilibrium payoff vector of a standard finitely repeated game is an equilibrium payoff vector of the same game with monitoring options. We show that some finitely repeated games with monitoring options have sequential equilibrium outcomes which cannot be sustained under the standard model, even if the stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium. We also present sufficient conditions for a folk theorem, when the players have a long horizon.
- 神戸大学大学院経営学研究科の論文
神戸大学大学院経営学研究科 | 論文
- 制度的企業家を巡るディスコース : 制度派組織論への理論的含意
- 制度的企業家の理論的射程
- 制度的企業家の概念規定:埋め込まれたエージェンシーのパラドクスに対する理論的考察
- An Empirical Study on Career Development and Systems in the Traditional Culture Industry : Training of Geiko / Maiko and the Systems of “hanamachi” in Kyoto
- 働きながら学ぶことの真の意味とパワー : このアプローチを意識したキャリア・人事面での教材開発