On the constancy of bribe-proof solutions
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概要
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We consider the problem of choosing one point in a set of alternatives when monetary transfers are possible. In this context, Schummer (2000) shows that a social choice function must be a constant function if manipulation through bribes is ruled out. But he requires two kinds of domain-richness conditions. One is either smooth connectedness or the finiteness of the set of alternatives and the other is monotonical closedness. However, dispensing with the former condition, we alternatively prove the same result under a weaker condition than monotonical closedness
- Springerの論文
- 2003-08-00
Springer | 論文
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