幼児期の「心の理論」獲得におけるメタ表象の役割

概要

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This paper elucidates relationship between mind and representation by comparing Perner's approach to theory of mind (1991) with Wellman's (1990) to inquire how children develop understanding of the mind as representational. The most common test to assess children's understanding of others' thought and beliefs to predict actions is the false belief task where an actor has an object transfer problem. Children cannot pass this standard test until they are 4 years old. This shows that developmental implication with respect to how a child's mind is unfolding as a representational system and how children's understanding of the representational mind develops. However, there might be possibilities that younger children undergo real change in the concepts of reasoning other minds; they might not be able to express their abilities by immaturity in other capacities. In younger children, both task performance in language capacity (especially compliment syntax) and executive functioning (especially inhibitory control) are correlated with false belief task performance. Their developmental connections are discussed, and it is proposed that there are two ways of separate systems in theory of mind, where younger children reason other's simple intentions by detecting their desire/goal, perception, emotion, and where older children reason other's beliefs by representing representations.
2010-03-31