17世紀ロシアにおける非ロシア正教徒エリート政策

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In 17th-century Russia there were non-Russian Orthodox elites. They mainly consisted of Tatar soldiers (sluzhilye tatary) and mercenaries from the West. The former were the descendants of the Tatar elite, who had sought refuge in Russia, had been taken as prisoners in the battles between Russia and Tatar khanates, or had been integrated into the Russian army as a result of Russian territorial expansion. The latter, European mercenaries, were invited by the Russian government beginning in the reign of Ivan III, and their average number in the 17th century was 2,000-3,000 men. Researchers have analyzed the individual history of the Muslim and European elites, but most of the analysis may not have captured the backgrounds and intentions of the policies of the Russian government accurately, because the Russian government, in its decrees, often dealt with all non-Russian Orthodox people as foreigners (inozemtsy) without differentiating between their religion. The purpose of this article is to analyze comprehensively the policy of the Russian government for dealing with non-Russian Orthodox elites from 1613 to 1689. The sluzhilye tatary had special importance in the Russian army for their skill in battle, but after the introduction of the new formation regiments adopting the European style in the mid-17th century, their role in the army declined. At the same time, European mercenaries gained higher positions as generals and officers in the new formation regiments. The legal status of these non-Orthodox elites, both the sluzhilye tatary and the European mercenaries, was generally equal to that of the Russian middle service class (dvoriane, deti boiarskie); however, their rights to possession of real estate and servants were limited. There had already been restrictions on possessing Russian-Orthodox servants by non-Orthodox people in the 16th century, but the restrictions were put into operation increasingly strictly in the 17th century. With regard to the restriction on possessing real estate, in the first half of the 17th century, the non-Orthodox elites were allowed to purchase and sell or exchange their own land (pomest'e) only among non-Orthodox people. However, the right to possession of land for non-Orthodox people was abolished in the middle of the 17th century under the pretext of abuse of Orthodox farmers by non-Orthodox landowners. If the non-Orthodox elites converted to the Russian Orthodox religion, they could obtain completely equal legal status with the Russian elite, and could keep servants and land legally. Tightening restrictions, therefore, encouraged conversion to the Russian Orthodox Church. Non-Orthodoxies were also limited in their freedom of religion in Russia. It is true that the Russian government permitted the existence of Islamic and Protestant religious institutions and clergies, and thus the non-Orthodox elites enjoyed a certain religious freedom. However, pressure for conversion to the Orthodox church did actually exist. Until the mid-17th century this pressure took the form of economic encouragement such as rewards of money, land and clothes. This policy changed in the mid-17th century to a stricter one including threats. As a result of the analysis of this paper, it has become clear that the Russian government issued oppressive decrees in the 1640-50s and 1670-80s on both Muslim and European elites. It is notable that these decrees were issued at a time when the importance of the European officers in the Russian army was rising and, conversely, that of the Muslim elite was declining. Many researchers have already pointed out the reasons behind the issuance of these decrees in the latter half of the 17th century for Muslims and Europeans individually. The following are some of the reasons: the decline in the importance of Muslim soldiers in the Russian army; the upsurge of an anti-Islamic trend caused by the Russo-Ottoman War; and the loss of the Russian government’s enchantment with European mercenaries as a result of military defeats. However, as these oppressive decrees were issued for both the Muslim and European elites simultaneously, these reasons are not enough to explain the change in policy towards these non-Orthodox elites. This accordance indicates that the policy towards the non-Orthodox elites in the second half of the 17th century has its base in a view held by the Russian Orthodox Church, which divides people into either Orthodoxes or non-Orthodoxes. It is, however, also true that the government controlled the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church. In the same period, conversion policies were not put into operation in peripheral territories, where the political situation was unstable and different policies were required towards non-Orthodox people to keep public peace. Throughout the 17th century, the Russian government maintained its efforts to discourage ordinary Russians from being affected religiously by the non-Russian elites. The means to achieve this aim became increasingly severe for the non-Orthodox elites as time went on, especially in the second half of the century. At the end of the 17th century, the government implemented the policy of conversion with threats, which led to the removal of the non-Orthodox elites from the ruling class. This policy perfectly matched the views of the Russian Orthodox Church. This would seem to imply that the change of relationship between the government and the Orthodox Church affected the policy toward the non-Russian elites to some degree.

17世紀ロシアにおける非ロシア正教徒エリート政策

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