Correlated quantal responses and equilibrium selection
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This paper considers incomplete information games with payoffs subject to correlated random disturbances. It explains the connection between the uniqueness of quantal response equilibria, where large noise is required, and the uniqueness of equilibria in global games, where small noise is required. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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