道徳と自己の存在に関する試論 : 道徳の基盤を存在論的観点から語ること
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投稿論文0. 問いの端緒1. 道徳の根本問題はどこにあるのか2. 道徳を存在論的観点から問い直すということ3. 「意志の弱さ」がもたらす道徳への問い4. 「意志の弱さ」が解き明かす「道徳的であること」と自己の存在との関係5. 「倫理的に」存在するとは意図的であること : 他なる世界の生起6. 「倫理的である」ことは普遍的であるのか7. 「倫理的である」とは,存在の可能的不在へと差し向けられることThe basic inquiry, 'why should I be moral ?', is essentially to seek for the rationale of the validity itself of morals. That is, what is here to be asked is a reason why 'this-F should be moral in spite of no need to be so rationally. Nevertheless, without replying to this seriously, so far moral philosophy seems only to have been elucidating an aim and a meaning of moral judgements or activities so as to be in vindication of morals. Morals is there made an obvious premise as a system, and a moral agent is taken for merely a general-formal one who cannot but be subjct to that system. Then, to give another reply not as before, this paper aims at sorting out the structure of a primitive state of 'I-being-moral' from the ontological point of view. In short, apart from the regulative moral system, 'this-F will become aware of 'I-being' in a different way from the existence ruled over by that system. And with that 'this-F (namely the very unique Self as agent), who can be either moral or immoral, comes to express his own attitude intentionally and autonomically toward morals. Just this process should be moral, in other words 'ethical', that may be at the same time accompanied with the transformation of the world where 'this-I' appears.